Creating and sharing knowledge to help end poverty Regulation has come under attack for its lack of proper structures and flawed rules, which have been held to be among the main causes of the global credit crisis. As a result, a major reform exercise is under way. This paper argues that, as part of this reform, policy makers and regulators must attempt to widen the objectives of International Financial Regulation so that they become cognizant of the impact of financial sector development and access to finance on economic growth and poverty eradication. In this context, the paper proposes a global licensing scheme for international investment funds and the reform of the Basle Capital Adequacy Standards.
Introduction
It could be safe to say that the pursuit of economic development and poverty reduction in the poorest of the developing countries has largely failed. Explanations about the causes of such failure range from lack of natural endowments, cultural barriers and path dependence to severe governance failures (including corruption and lack of properly functioning institutions). It has been well documented that these situations sometimes prove to be severe obstacles to the operation of well functioning markets, the development of the domestic financial system, and the attraction of foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the development agenda in the post-Washington consensus era is struggling to address the issues of development and poverty eradication by devising innovative approaches that can withstand the scrutiny of empirical testing without repeating the mistakes of Washington Consensus policies.
Widening access to finance, one of the main ingredients of Financial Sector Development (FSD) -the most recent acquisition in the armoury of development policies -has come to be considered as key tool in the struggle for growth and eradication of poverty. It is in this context that the use of microfinance schemes, which mainly comprise the provision of financial services to the poor, 1 is seen as a potent weapon in the fight against poverty.
It is also widely acknowledged that policies that facilitate access to finance are of great importance in the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals 1 See Jonathan Morduch, 'The Microfinance Promise ' (1999) 3 The lesson from the Monterey conference is that new and innovative approaches must be devised to facilitate access to finance fostering financial sector development and supporting microcredit and microenterprise schemes, at least, when they are commercially viable. It follows that global financial markets should be one of the main tools used by policy initiatives that seek to foster development and eradicate poverty.
Global financial markets have grown exponentially in the past two decades, due to a combination of factors such as technological advancements, abolition of national restrictions on capital flows, and trade liberalization. To a large extent the markets for banking and investment capital are borderless, whereas the regulators supervising parts of them and their rulebooks are subject to jurisdictional constraints. 4 This paradox seems to have been resolved through the so called 'soft law' approach. 5 Since the 1990s we have witnessed the gradual emergence of a global regulatory system for international financial markets. This comprises recognized international law actors such as the IMF Committee on Banking Supervision, 7 which has designed regulatory standards for the cross-border supervision of international banks. Regulatory initiatives emanating from those centres attempt to address the challenges of an increasingly integrated global marketplace and are focused on fostering the convergence of national regulatory systems, especially in terms of governing principles and rule content.
Although the official membership of the Basle Committee is restricted to representatives from a small number of countries and the standards it promulgates do not, prima facie, have binding legal force, the process through which they are drafted and the institutional might of participant organizations mean that most of them end up incorporated into national legal systems. For this reason, they are considered part of the emerging body of global administrative law 8 and are treated and examined with the deference reserved for formal legal rules by both national regulators and the global financial services industry. 6 As a federation of national securities Commissions whose members regulate more than 90% of the world's securities markets, IOSCO is the most influential international standard setter for securities markets. IOSCO adopted in 1998 a comprehensive set of Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles), which are today recognized as the international regulatory benchmarks for all securities markets. In 2002 IOSCO adopted a multilateral memorandum of understanding designed to facilitate cross-border enforcement and exchange of information among the international community of securities regulators. The main objectives of IOSCO principles and of their enforcement are (a) The protection of investors, (b) Ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, (c) the reduction of systemic risk. The Executive Committee of IOSCO has established two specialized working Committees: the Technical Committee and the Emerging Markets Committee. The more influential Technical Committee comprises fifteen agencies that regulate some of the world's larger, more developed, and internationalized markets. See www.Iosco.org.
In recent months International Financial Regulation has come for fierce criticism, as its lack of proper structures and the operation flawed rules have been held to be among the main causes of the global credit crisis. 10 As a result, a major reform exercise is under way. This paper argues that, as part of this reform, national and international policy makers and regulators must take into account, apart from the regulatory objectives of systemic stability and investor/depositor protection, the wider objectives of economic development and poverty eradication, especially in very poor countries. In this context, the paper proposes a set of concrete policy reforms that would enable International
Financial Regulation to achieve a wider set of policy objectives.
This paper is divided in six sections. The first section is the present introduction. The second section discusses the impact of financial sector development and access to finance on economic growth and rates of poverty. The third section discusses some of the different tenets of international financial regulation giving special emphasis on the function of the Basle Committee's capital adequacy standards for banks. The fourth section sets out the main parameters of the paper's reform proposals. The fifth section explains how a reform of the Basle capital adequacy standards and the establishment of a global licensing scheme for international investment funds could both enhance global financial stability and access to finance in poor and very poor countries. The sixth section brings the different straddles of the present analysis to a comprehensive conclusion. 
Financial Sector

The Link between FSD and Growth
Over the recent years a large number of studies have been undertaken examining the link between FSD and growth. 26 Thus, a large body of evidence now supports the theory that the deeper a country's financial system the higher its growth potential. 27 This is due to a number of factors. Finance allocates resources to their most productive use and allows for the renewal of a country's economy by pulling funding from underperforming or ageing sectors and pouring them to newer, more innovative and promising ones, much in accord with Schumpeter's theory of 'creative destruction'. 28 In addition, finance helps growth through facilitation of raising and pooling of funds to undertake risky investments and through the creation of innovative instruments, which can be used for risk mitigation.
One of the first studies to find empirical evidence of the close correlation between financial sector development (FSD) and the overall rate of a country's economic growth Levine, Loayza, and Beck, Financial Intermediation and Growth, n. 24 above. 35 Calderon and Liu, n 27 above.
Liu's study suggested that financial sector under-development is more likely to hold growth back in developing countries.
Furthermore, Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) 36 suggest that financial sector underdevelopment could be a serious obstacle to growth even when a country has established other conditions necessary for sustained economic development. For instance, they found evidence that countries with a high level of educational achievement, but a low level of FSD, were trapped in relatively low standards of living compared to those countries with a similar level of educational attainment, but a more developed financial sector. Moreover, they found that educational attainment had no significant impact on growth in countries where FSD was weak. This result implies that the lack of a sufficiently developed financial system may compromise the positive contribution of education to growth.
Availability of Finance and Poverty Alleviation
It is certain that the availability of financial services has a direct impact on poverty at the micro level, primarily by affecting the ability of poor people to accumulate usefully large lump sums-whether for life cycle, emergency or opportunity investment purposes.
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Thus, access to credit, insurance, and savings facilities can reduce the vulnerability of the poor to a number of external shocks, including bad harvests or health difficulties. The mobilisation of savings also creates an opportunity for re-lending the collected funds into the community strengthening community ties. Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2003) found that inequality decreases as finance develops and, the more concentrated income is the higher the country's level of poverty. The fact that finance helps to distribute income opportunities more evenly becomes a significant factor in poverty reduction. 42 In the same mode, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, using a broad cross-country sample, have shown that financial development not only raises disproportionately the income of the poor reducing income inequality, but also that countries with better-developed financial intermediaries experience faster declines in poverty and income inequality.
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Beyond (the largely unmeasured) direct impact of access to/usage of financial services on poverty, the indirect impact of FSD on poverty is certain through its impact on growth.
For instance, as economic production is changing and countries are liberalizing their economies, it has become clearer that the degree of financial development greatly influences the ability of countries, firms and individuals to make use of (new) 
Aspects of International Financial Regulation
Introduction
It is widely accepted that financial stability regulation can also affect growth and thus poverty. 47 In fact, relevant evidence suggests that financial crises severely affect the poorest and most vulnerable groups as they cause major reduction in growth levels and increase poverty.
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Therefore, financial regulation has an economic (development/poverty reduction) and a social aspect -an increase in poverty levels leads to social strife -much bigger than it was suspected a decade ago.
Regulation can also have important implications for access to finance of poorer clients through its impact on the incentives financial institutions have to innovate, compete, and increase their low income customer base. 49 In addition, as it is argued in this paper, financial regulation may be used as tool to widen access to finance and thus foster growth and facilitate poverty eradication. Given the integrated nature of global financial markets and the increasing importance of international financial regulation, this paper focuses on international financial regulation reform and does not touch on national regulatory regimes. Accordingly, the next two paragraphs provide a concise analysis of the remit and work of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and of its Capital Adequacy Standards. Further to this work, the Committee devised in the 1980s a common framework of guidelines governing the measurement and enforcement of bank capital adequacy. This referred to the prescribed capital resources that internationally active banks were required to set aside so that to be deemed as operating on a prudent and sound basis.
The Basle Framework
In this respect, the Committee developed a framework of standards that would foster effective capital adequacy regulation of banks and facilitate convergence of national regulatory standards in this field. The main focus of the first framework (widely known as Basle I), published in 1988, was on credit (counterparty) risk and much less on other important risks such as currency risk, interest rate risk, and market risk. In this respect, the framework required a minimum 'ratio of certain specified constituents of capital to risk-weighted assets.' The prescribed regulatory capital constituents comprised: Tier 1 (core) capital, which mainly consists of shareholders equity, disclosed reserves, and retained post tax profit and Tier 2 (supplementary) capital, which mainly consists of subordinated debt. The Basle I framework endorsed a risk-weighted approach to the assets denominator of the capital assets ratio. 54 The Basle I framework established a relatively simple methodology for risk-weighting with only five risk weights: 0, 10, 20, 50
and 100 percent of asset value, assigned to all types of assets and all types of counterparties, judged by the origin of the counterparty (OECD non-OECD countries) and its organizational/legal/economic nature (sovereigns, credit institutions, corporates), without any separate assessment of its creditworthiness. For instance, the risk-weighted ratio for all corporates was one hundred percent (100%). In addition, following further consultation, the Basle Committee adopted a target standard capital to assets ratio of eight percent (8%) of which core capital constituted at least four percent (4%).
Due to the institutional weight of participating public organizations, the importance of the countries they represented, and the need to level the playing field in the fast growing global market for financial services, the Basle I Accord has been adopted by most countries, regardless of whether they participated in the workings of the Committee. In fact, most developed countries, including the US and the EU member states, extended the application of the Basle I framework to domestic banks that did not maintain a significant international presence.
However, it soon became apparent that the Basle I framework suffered from a number of technical weaknesses relating to its narrow band of credit risk classifications 55 and its inability to adapt to changes in the global financial services industry. It was especially inept at accommodating the emergent new techniques and instruments used to mitigate risk, such as credit derivatives and securitisations. In addition, the narrow band of borrower classification did not allow lenders to distinguish between major, stable and recognized companies versus risky upstarts. 56 Moreover, little attention was given to correlations and the mitigating effect of uncorrelated credits to well diversified loan portfolios. 57 Finally, Basle I did not properly account for operational risk in banks' loan and securities market portfolios.
The Basle II Framework
The weaknesses of Basle I led to an extensive round of negotiations for the drafting of a new accord. Given the many changes in the financial services industry and the growing difficulties experienced by supervisors with the complexity and changing nature of risk in global financial markets, the starting point was to emphasize the role of market discipline in risk management. In June 1999, the BIS issued a proposal that would significantly change the capital adequacy Accord through extensive revision and refinement of Basle minimum capital requirements; Pillar 2 describes the process for the supervisory review of capital adequacy; and Pillar 3 provides the mechanisms to facilitate and enforce market discipline through public disclosure.
Of the three pillars, by far the most extensively discussed in the successive consultation rounds was Pillar 1, which involves significant changes in capital adequacy regulation.
More specifically, although Pillar 1 reproduces the basic provisions of Basle I, it also introduces important changes in the way aspects of credit risk are to be calculated and expands the range of risks to include operational risk. Three different options are available to banks to measure the regulatory capital that they have to assign for each asset. The first option is the standardized approach, which is intended to be used by less The IRB approach is based on measures of unexpected losses (UL) and expected losses (EL). The risk components include measures of the probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), the exposure at default (EAD), and effective maturity (M). In some cases, banks may be required to use a supervisory value as opposed to an internal estimate for one or more of the risk components. 61 In the foundation version of IRB, only PD is calculated by the bank and all other risk components are specified by the supervisor. In the advanced version, all credit risk components are calculated by the bank itself. This means that the advanced approach relies entirely on 'self-supervision', except that the bank has to qualify the models it uses with the supervisor and obtain its approval. Collateral and loan guarantees are to be taken into account.
In relation to the application of IRB approaches to risk assessment, a specific framework has been created for the treatment of corporate exposures that present the characteristics of specialized loans (SLs). As SLs qualify corporate credits that rely, for repayment of the loans, upon a stream of income generated by an asset rather than the creditworthiness of the borrower, such as project finance, income-producing real estate, lease financing (or 'object financing'), commodity financing, and high-volatility commercial real estate. These forms of credit financing are subject to a tailor made framework of capital standards.
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For a number of reasons the Basle II framework has given rise to several serious concerns. First, it provides no framework for the creation of liquidity cushions within highly geared financial institutions. The liquidity crunch that followed the trigger of the global credit crisis in July 2007 has shown that the existence of liquidity cushions is necessary to stabilize banking institutions and avert a credit crisis. Second, the framework is very pro-cyclical providing an inadequate capital cushion during economic 61 Basle II Accord, paras 210-212. The term private development finance is understood to extend to all microfinance and 70 While private development finance schemes must be provided and administered at the local level for reasons of furthering access to finance, of increasing microfinance penetration, and of lowering transaction costs and information asymmetries all of which lead to higher efficiencies, the funding of MFIs is more efficiently managed if it is centralized or conducted on a wholesale basis. A good example of a centralized national scheme used for the funding of private institutions operating in unbanked areas (administration of government subsidy funding distributed to MFIs) and the provision of infrastructure services to them is the Mexican development bank BANSEFI (Banco de Ahorro Nacional y Servicios Financieros, National Savings and Financial Services Bank). See for an analytical description of the operation of BANSEFI, de la Torre et al., Innovative Experiences in Access to Finance, n 12 above, pp. 48-51. 71 Granting private development finance loans to a centralized country scheme that operates as an independent entity or other specialized corporate vehicle operating as wholesale finance provider would allow these credits to fulfill most of the requirements of para. 219 of Basle II as regards the legal form and economic substance of SLs. However, the independent entity would be created specifically to finance onlending and not physical assets, as required by paragraph 219. MFIs obtaining funds for lending under the above scheme would be subject to a number of conditions. End-lenders would be obliged to account for the destination of the borrowed funds and to build databases about the profiles of their borrowers and the nature and repayment rates of loans given out of such funds. Although the flow of information would come from the end-lenders, there is no serious reason to worry about its quality. End-lenders would have a strong incentive not to lie about the default rate of their private development finance loans and the destination of funding so obtained; if found cheating they would be expelled from the scheme or denied further loans by the wholesale provider. In addition, the World Bank could be actively involved in the building of these schemes and the structure of the rules and incentives of their operation at the initial stages.
Large international banks already use the more sophisticated advanced version of IRB, which enables them to set aside less regulatory capital for their loans and securities portfolio. Thus, the use of wholesale methods to resource private development finance providers coupled with lower capital adequacy requirements means that very large international credit institutions would have the right set of incentives to enter the market for the provision of credit to the poor. Lower capital charges would allow such loans to become a business opportunity for large credit institutions, which would also lower the interest rates charged, as the high monitoring and transaction costs that such loans typically entail would continue to be borne by the end lenders. Therefore, the present proposal may, to some extent, boost credit flows to developing countries redressing some of the aforementioned concerns discussed regarding the impact of Basle II on developing countries.
Another advantage of the separation of private development finance loans from other forms of microcredit is that it would enable some MFIs and other credit providers to specialize in the provision of such loans enhancing their credit ratings, given the high repayment rate of such credits. Securing higher credit ratings would enable these institutions to attract loans from large domestic banks in the developing world that will use the standardized approach under Basel II. As mentioned in the previous section, the standardized approach assigns lower regulatory capital charges to higher rated counterparties. MFIs that found commercial funding at advantageous rates either because their credit ratings had been raised, or because they obtained such funding from centralized schemes or wholesale providers that would utilize the private development loans facility, would free up local and international resources and donor money. These funds could then be used for aid to the very poor and to subsidize mirofinance loans that belong to the category of 'consumption loans', as divided above,
where the risk of default is much higher perhaps unsustainable for profit driven organizations.
A Global Licensing Regime for International Investment Funds
Hedge funds seem to cause systemic problems during any kind of market turmoil and often require the same kind of liquidity support as that offered to banks. entity for a fee. Also, the IMF could set up a pre-funded liquidity insurance scheme for international investment funds interested in entering the IIFA scheme.
Furthermore, international investment funds would be allowed to register with the scheme under three conditions:
(a) provide the IIFA with full access to information regarding the composition and structure of their balance sheets (but not to the composition of their membership, which is a sensitive issue, especially for SWFs); The above conditions ensure that international investment funds are subjected to a reasonable and well balanced international regulatory regime, which, with minimum interference, both safeguards global systemic stability (through disclosure and liquidity insurance) and fosters development in poor and very poor countries.
A New Framework For International Financial Regulation
The Modification of the Basle Capital Adequacy Standards
Arguably, the largest constraint that MFIs face in order to grow in scale and become very significant players in the fight against poverty is lack of commercial funding. 
A Global Regime for International Investment Funds and the Financing of Private Development Projects
Forcing international investment funds to invest in very poor countries the charge/fee (calculated at a ratio over their assets) they would have to pay to participate into a global licensing regime amounts to a global tax/subsidy in favour of very poor countries.
However, as investment funds would be free to select the recipients of their investments it would lead to considerable development benefits. Also, the possibility of investment funds recouping their investment should not be discounted. First, the suggested scheme would help worthy low-scale investment projects to bypass the government owned banks whose lending has mostly political rather than development motivations. 81 Second, it would not be predicated on institutional reform, which is gradual and thus slow to provide benefits. 82 Third, foreign investment would be attracted for low-scale development projects without reliance on domestic securities markets which usually are volatile and shallow. 83 Fourth, since the licensed funds would be required to compulsorily invest their money in any of the very poor countries selected by the UN or the World Bank, they would concentrate on worthy business propositions from individuals and SMEs in very poor countries with a relatively higher level of political stability, functional institutions, and better prospects of peace and formation of civil society. Thus, a virtuous circle would be created, where private investment money directed to poor countries with relatively more sound institutions and comparatively more stable social and political lives offers an incentive to countries left out to follow the lead of their peers. Fifth, a market would be created in very poor countries for projects capable of attracting investment funds' money incentivising parts of the local population to acquire entrepreneurial skills and some form of financial expertise. Sixth, the kind of commitment required by the investment funds would mean their long term involvement and as a result the usual risks that deter foreign investors would become immaterial. Finally, in order not to lose money on their forced investments, international funds would use innovative hedging and financing techniques such as asset swaps and derivatives. The institutions underwriting those investments would naturally try to hedge their own positions buying in many cases the underlying investments. This would breathe life to local securities markets facilitating their development. Moreover, a certain 'buzz' would be created around very poor countries such as Mali, or Namibia, which would thus enter the 'radar' of the global investment community. These are normally countries not favoured by FDI providers, since FDI is mostly concentrated in the best performing emerging markets.
Conclusion
The goal of poverty eradication has been adopted by the international community of nations to be the paramount target of the 21 st century. The global financial community not only has the tools but also the resources to commit to this effort. It should thus be provided with the right incentives to take an active part. International Financial Regulation standards, prima facie, target the facilitation of the global public interests of depositor/investor protection and systemic stability. Thus, it should not be unthinkable that a further policy objective that of facilitation of development and poverty eradication in poor and very poor countries complemented the said regulatory objectives. This paper has provided, in a forward thinking way, two reform proposals for International Financial Regulation, which can serve all of the aforementioned objectives without compromising the attainment of any of them.
Finally, the countries, which would attract the private development loans and investment funds envisaged in the present paper, are those suffering serious economic and social injustices. These range from inequitable allocation of land that has resulted in the concentration of land ownership to very few hands to the foreclosure of access to business credit and investment for young entrepreneurs. Such dysfunctions result in the perpetuation of the dominance of the ruling classes through their control of the means of production and consequently of the political process inhibiting innovation and perpetuating corruption and inequality. The cathartic role of financial markets through their merit-based approach to the granting of finance should not be underestimated nor should its potential to place irresistible pressure on the old and invariably corrupt political and economic elites. On the contrary, international finance providers should be provided with the right set of regulatory incentives/obligations to achieve this goal and this is the overriding objective of the present paper.
